Brussels: Europe and the Arabs
The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, will travel to Beijing on December 1 to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The visit comes in the wake of the European Council's strategic discussion on the European Union's relations with China last October, and after heated debates in the European Parliament this week.
A European statement in Brussels said that against the background of the tense geopolitical and economic environment, the visit is an appropriate opportunity for both the EU and China to discuss joint action. The leaders of the European Union and China will discuss global challenges as well as issues of common interest. During a discussion session between members of the legislative institution of the European Union, in the presence of Josep Borrell, foreign policy coordinator, the latter said, "The debate in the European Parliament on relations between the European Union and China is very timely because we had a strategic discussion on China in the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council. Also, we have witnessed The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, all of this is happening this month [one month ago]. strong power over the state and, in particular, over public institutions; the growing ideological nature of the Chinese political system with the development of both the Chinese Marxist style - or the Chinese way - and hyper-nationalist rhetoric. In Xi Jinping's speech, the word "security" is used 29 times, in Xi's report compared to 18 times during the previous conference.So, the last time we discussed EU-China relations here was on April 5, right after the EU-China summit.It was addressing and changing China's ambiguous position on Russia's war in Ukraine is the main goal of the European Union. China has not been too eager to listen, but talking through differences is what mature partners should do. Several months later, Russia's aggression against Ukraine continues. While we maintain our focus on the war on our eastern frontier, our interest in China has not diminished. China has not yet condemned Russia's war [of aggression] against Ukraine — and the atrocities taking place there — but it has drawn clear red lines, and is increasingly concerned about the global consequences. The red lines around the use of nuclear weapons, and in Bali [at the G20], also send a clear message about the global consequences and the concerns they have about them. At the same time, it is no secret that we and China have a different political system, that we view democracy and human rights differently, that we follow different models of governance, [and] we have a different view of pluralism. But these differences should not and do not prevent us from engaging with each other. China is becoming increasingly assertive and developing increasingly tough competition. This is another fact, and I [sorry] have to announce that it will remain the same in the years to come. This is why we must have a clear, consistent and sustainable strategy towards China. In the recent position paper, the realistic approach we adopted in 2019 must be reaffirmed as it is neither naive nor alarmist. It is rooted in the need to share, compete and stand up for our values; And I think it still applies. If we want to defend our interests and tackle global challenges - climate change, but also the environment and health - we need to talk, we need to act, we need to trade and negotiate with China. EU leaders reaffirmed this at the European Council. They also agreed on the fundamental importance of our unity in all aspects of the EU-China relationship: without unity, we will lose credibility and influence, both in the face of China and globally. This is why it is so important, in our approach to China, that we try to find a synthesis of different points of view and maintain a strong unity. I can tell you that EU leaders also agreed that the EU needs to step up its work on reducing dependencies and strategic vulnerabilities - diversifying sources of supply and improving internal resilience. This applies to raw materials and semiconductors - both of which are important to the green transition. Addressing cyber and hybrid threats is something that should also be high on our agenda, and step up our engagement with both like-minded and non-like-minded partners to better deal with them. In short, to be concrete and short, we need to expand the economic and political dimensions of our partnership, propose sustainable solutions to major challenges and prove that our cooperation, our “offer” of cooperation is as valuable as our political partnership. Political partnership is needed, and concrete offers - I've said that before, in a question I answered - are also important. Our Indo-Pacific strategy and the Global Gateway initiative [Strategy] are central to this offering. I come from Central Asia, and I can tell you that Central Asian countries are looking at us, waiting for [our] partnership, waiting for [our] support because they don't want to be sandwiched between China and Russia. They want a more balanced foreign policy. This part of the world—which, a few years ago, might have been considered "in the middle of nowhere"—is now "in the middle of it all." This is a good example of how we can increase our partnership with people who are not necessarily, like-minded [partners], but with whom we share a geostrategic interest. This is important and that is why I am counting on this Parliament to support the work we are developing.

We hope that today's discussion will shed some light on our work, insisting on the fact that we need - at the same time - to be part of fierce competition, that we need to cooperate in certain areas, and we have to understand that, in many ways with others, we will engage in systemic competition . This does not mean being in constant competition in [everything], in [every] field, for everything, everywhere.

Communication channels with Beijing must be open. Not even Americans are calling for the decoupling of their economies - and neither are we. But for sure, human rights issues will be high on our agenda. We need to update our China policy in light of recent developments and, in particular, the very important US [US] announcement on October 7, regarding the significant reduction in China's access to US semiconductor technology. This is a decision that must be taken into account.

The technological battle will be absolutely fundamental to our immediate future. Semiconductors are, indeed, the fundamental technological issue of economic competition in the 21st century. We have to develop, too, a dialogue with other countries that are in a similar situation to us - [I'm] thinking, in particular, of Japan. [We have to] maintain the dialogue with the United States - this dialogue [between the European Union and the United States] will take place next week. The Secretary General of the [European] External Action Service, [Stefano Sannino], and my team will travel to Washington for this high-level policy dialogue on China. Certainly, the United States is our most important ally, but in some cases, we will not be in the same position or on the same approach to China.